

is a serious military man. Israeli officials are sure to spend the aftermath of Mr. Barak's visit sorting out the vast differences between the assumptions of the Clinton game plan and Israel's military realities.

The military threat to Israel used to consist of the massed armies of its immediate neighbors. But today's most ominous threat is weapons of mass destruction carried by missiles from Iraq, Iran, Syria and perhaps Libya. Israel's foes believe they could break Israeli military power in the opening minutes of a war by launching ballistic missile strikes with chemical or biological weapons against mobilization centers and weapons-storage areas. These countries have made an enormous investment in new missiles, most stored in deep tunnels, highly fortified bunkers or mobile launchers.

Gen. Eitan Ben Eliahu of the Israeli Air Force has estimated that Syria alone already has some 1,000 ballistic missiles, and that within a few years most will have long ranges. Syria does not need long-range missiles to hit Israel, but with longer ranges, each missile fired from Syria would develop enough re-entry speed to negate Israel's budding antimissile system, the Arrow. Already Iran's Shahib 3 missiles—developed with Russian, Chinese and North Korean help—stress the Arrow; the forthcoming Shahib 4's will overwhelm it.

To keep up with the increasing capability of enemy missiles, Israel's Arrow needs to be connected to the projected U.S. space-based fire-control system. But the Clinton administration doesn't want this system for the U.S., much less for Israel, for fear of violating the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Antiballistic Missile Treaty. To handle the overwhelming number of enemy missiles, Israel would need a U.S. orbital antimissile device. But the administration has delayed tests of a space-based laser that had been set for 2001. So Mr. Barak won't get any missile defense out of Mr. Clinton.

The Israeli Air Force has some pretty sophisticated plans for the nearly impossible job of striking enemy missiles before they are launched. But these plans require lots of deep-strike F-15 I aircraft. Israel has only 25; it has been negotiating for 15 more. Washington would rather see Israel buy more F-16's, which can't help Israel with its missile problem. The F-16's are less threatening to Syria, which the administration sees as the key to peace.

Instead of military help, the Clinton administration will give Mr. Barak generous instructions in its own conception of peace in the Middle East. Yet Mr. Barak will be compelled to note that Mr. Clinton's view of the world clashes with the one that Israel has been developing for some time, regardless of its dealings with the Palestinians.

Following the traditional maxim that foreign policy proceeds from the nature of the regime, Israel has sought alliances with Turkey and Jordan, because their regimes are stable, and because their friendship is secured in part by their enmity with Syria. Israel has talked about cooperation on missile defense with both Ankara and Amman, which see themselves as part of the West against Russian-supported forces in the region. Another main reason why Turkey and Jordan are interested in the alliance is Israel's deep-strike capability against Iran and Iraq.

Israel has been wary of Egypt, and even more of Saudi Arabia, because although the governments in these countries U.S. allies, instability would vitiate any deal with them. As for Syria, much as Israel would like a deal with it, its enmity is mitigated only by its instability.

The Clinton administration is trying to transcend traditional alliances. In the Wil-

sonian tradition, it seeks a settlement including all and directed against none. It believes that the path to peace includes exchanging military advantages for goodwill, "guaranteed" by some sort of international contact group. Thus the Clinton administration would bless the only deal Syria would accept—Israel's surrender of the Golan Heights—and call it peace.

Some Israelis would be happy with this, because it would carry the implicit assurance that the U.S. would assume responsibility for Israel's borders. It should be crystal clear, however, that Washington has neither the interest nor the capacity to hold Syria to any deal, much less to fight for Israel.

Here then is the choice Mr. Barak must mull on his way home: He can trust the Clinton team and move his country toward a deal with its enemies that violates normal rules of military prudence. Or he can seek the military means of being useful to his Turkish and Jordanian friends while being fearsome to states that are enemies of America and Israel alike.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH LIBYA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 48

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since my last report of December 30, 1998, concerning the national emergency with respect to Libya that was declared in Executive Order 12543 of January 7, 1986. This report is submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c); section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c); and section 505(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9(c).

1. On December 30, 1998, I renewed for another year the national emergency with respect to Libya pursuant to IEEPA. This renewal extended the current comprehensive financial and trade embargo against Libya in effect since 1986. Under these sanctions, virtually all trade with Libya is prohibited, and all assets owned or controlled by the

Government of Libya in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked.

2. On April 28, 1999, I announced that the United States will exempt commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment from future unilateral sanctions regimes. In addition, my Administration will extend this policy to existing sanctions programs by modifying licensing policies for currently embargoed countries to permit case-by-case review of specific proposals for commercial sales of these items. Certain restrictions apply.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury is currently drafting amendments to the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 550 (the Regulations), to implement this initiative. The amended Regulations will provide for the licensing of sales of agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical supplies to non-governmental entities in Libya or to government procurement agencies and parastatals not affiliated with the coercive organs of that country. The amended Regulations will also provide for the licensing of all transactions necessary and incident to licensed sales transactions, such as insurance and shipping arrangements. Financing for the licensed sales transactions will be permitted in the manner described in the amended Regulations.

3. During the reporting period, OFAC reviewed numerous applications for licenses to authorize transactions under the Regulations. Consistent with OFAC's ongoing scrutiny of banking transactions, the largest category of license approvals (20) involved types of financial transactions that are consistent with U.S. policy. Most of these licenses authorized personal remittances not involving Libya between persons who are not blocked parties to flow through Libyan banks located outside Libya. Three licenses were issued authorizing certain travel-related transactions. One license was issued to a U.S. firm to allow it to protect its intellectual property rights in Libya; another authorized receipt of payment for legal services; and a third authorized payments for telecommunications services. A total of 26 licenses were issued during the reporting period.

4. During the current 6-month period, OFAC continued to emphasize to the international banking community in the United States the importance of identifying and blocking payments made by or on behalf of Libya. The office worked closely with the banks to assure the effectiveness of interdiction software systems used to identify such payments. During the reporting period, 87 transactions potentially involving Libya, totaling nearly \$3.4 million, were interdicted.